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Recent events have focussed attention on corporate governance resulting in expectations for 
greater responsibility to shareholders and increasing obligations to an expanding group of 
stakeholders.  Our research explores the application of the increased emphasis on corporate 
governance in the SME context including application of the converging definitions and expanding 
expectations and some specific challenges.    
 





here has been increased attention on corporate governance and responsibility in recent years while at 
the same time there is additional emphasis on the importance of small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) as drivers of economic growth in Canada, the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU).  This provides a compelling background to explore corporate governance issues impacting SMEs.  The 
negative consequences of illegal and unethical corporate practices have provided impetus to re-examine the 
changing roles, responsibilities and public expectations for corporate governance.  While recent attention has 
occurred most frequently in the large business environment, the impact on the changing roles of board members for 
organizations of all kinds should not be overlooked (Teksten, Moser & Elbert, 2005).  This article explores 
corporate governance in SMEs commencing with an overview of the background to corporate governance and its 
expanding expectations.  
 
BACKGROUND CORPORATE PHILOSOPHIES 
 
Historical business philosophy has influenced the role of corporate governance.  There are two predominant 
governance models in the business world: the shareholder wealth maximization model (also known as the 
shareholder value maximization model) and the stakeholder capitalism model (also known as stakeholder value 
maximization model).  The shareholder wealth maximization (SWM) model is mainly practiced in the Anglo-
American markets such as the United Kingdom, the US and Canada hence it has also frequently been labelled as the 
Anglo-American model.  The stakeholder capitalism (SCM) model is mainly practiced in continental Europe as well 
as Japan hence it has also been called the continental European model, the European Social model, or the non-
Anglo-American model.  In addition to different practicing countries, the two models differ in other aspects.  Table 
1 presents a comparison of the two models. 
 
The underlying assumptions about share price efficiency and systematic/unsystematic risk in the SWM 
model are drawn from the traditional finance theory, which has been under serious criticism in recent years.  These 
assumptions are the theoretical foundation of the SWM model and the view that the firm’s single and exclusive 
objective is to maximize shareholders’ wealth.   
 
Under the SWM model, management is often preoccupied with the task of how to meet the analysts’ 
quarterly earning expectations which are key determinants of the movement of the firm’s share price in the short 
term. Thus short-term profitability is more dominant than the firm’s long-term growth as a management objective.  
External pressure for super performance and internal drive for astronomic compensations can eventually lead to 
T 
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unethical and unlawful conduct.  From Enron’s collapse in 2001 to the recent financial crisis which originated on 
Wall Street, the tragic consequences of bad corporate governance are in evidence.  A number of top corporate 
executives have been prosecuted and convicted for their criminal conduct.  In some sense, these executives are also 
the victims of the so- called “impatient capital” which characterizes the SWM model.   
 
 
Table 1:  Comparison of Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Stakeholder Capitalism Models 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Model Stakeholder Capitalism Model 
Based on the assumption of share price efficiency i.e. the 
share price in the market reflects intrinsic value and 
shareholders’ wealth 
No assumption on share price efficiency 
Firm’s objective is to maximize shareholders’ wealth by 
achieving the highest possible total return to equity (including 
both capital appreciation and dividend distribution) 
Firm’s objective is to maximize corporate wealth but return to 
equity is constrained by the interest of other stakeholders 
such as creditors, employees, governments, etc. 
Only systematic risk is a prime concern for management as 
unsystematic risk is supposed to be diversified 
Total risk (operating and financial risk) is considered by 
management 
Corporate strategies are directed by the board on behalf of 
shareholders 
Corporate strategies are influenced by long-term stakeholders 
rather than mobile portfolio investors 
 
 
On the other hand, the multiple objectives of the SCM model are difficult to measure and evaluate.  The 
SCM model has come under increasing criticism for its lack of accountability to the firm’s owners - its shareholders, 
because it tries to meet the demands of a diffuse a group of stakeholders (Moffett, Stonehill & Eitman, 2003).  
Another issue with the SCM model is that the exclusion of the strong focus on the interests of mobile portfolio 
investors in corporate governance may hinder the inflow of much needed capital, particularly international capital. 
 
CONVERGENCE AND EXPANSION 
 
Progress in pursuit of a better governance model has already gone beyond pure academic discussions.  The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has issued a widely accepted set of principles 
for good corporate governance practices, covering the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders, 
the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the board 
(OECD, 2004).  This is an important milestone in corporate governance since some OECD member countries 
subscribed to the SWM model and others to the SCM model.  The OECD principles have established a common 
ground for the two camps combining the strengths and overcoming the shortcomings of both models and ensuring 
that the corporate goal has a long-term orientation, but at the same time the firm is accountable to a range of 
stakeholders and performance is measurable for investors. 
 
The pressure to strengthen corporate governance is also increasing across Europe.  “An atmosphere of 
litigation applying to companies falling short of accepted standards has also been growing …., with individual 
shareholders and classes of shareholders taking legal action against directors perceived to act in their own interest 
rather than on behalf of the company” (Plath & Wilde, 2005).  Recent events and the related emphasis on the role of 
corporate governance have now included ultimate responsibility to shareholders which is emphasised in the SWM 
model along with a level of responsibility to the interests of a wider group of stakeholders that has always been the 
distinguishing feature of the SCM model.   
 
In addition to the trend of convergence, the expectations on corporate governance are also expanding.  One 
such area is that of management empowerment.  At the same time that increased accountability is being 
implemented, management needs, more than ever, to be empowered in order to act entrepreneurially (Coulson-
Thomas, 2007).  This empowerment is essential to maximize opportunities available to the firm.  The incorporation 
of management control and management motivation into corporate governance presents a real challenge and adds a 
further complexity.  We use Figure 1 to depict corporate governance with the combination of an obligation to a 
broader range of stakeholders and a responsibility to empower management in addition to accountability to owners, 
as discussed in this section.  
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As a result of the emerging situation discussed in this section, corporate governance now includes increased 
fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, responsibility to an expanded group of stakeholders for their interests in the 
firm, and the ability to both control and motivate management. The next section considers the application of this 
expanded and expanding definition in relation to SMEs. 
 
GOVERNANCE IN THE SME CONTEXT 
 
The defining of corporate governance originated in the large business environment and its application and 
relevance to SMEs is largely unexplored (Coulson-Thomas, 2007) yet SMEs are expected to be the drivers of 
economic growth and providers of employment and investment opportunities in many nations, including Canada, the 
US and Europe and Australia (Banham, 2005; Wiesner, Macdonald & Banham, 2007 and Zahra, Neubaum & Naldi, 
2007).   
 
While organizational size and the overlap of management and ownership add complexity to governance in 
the SME context, this combination has always ensured that responsibility to owners exists to the highest possible 
degree.  In addition, since SMEs are largely unfettered in their decision making role – the owner/manager is free to 
act entrepreneurially which is considered essential in the rapidly changing business environment of today.  However 
without input from an effective and well structured board SMEs may not always see strategic opportunities 
(Brunninge, Nordqvist & Wiklund, 2007).  The capacity for entrepreneurial action is an advantage that SMEs do not 
want to sacrifice to improved governance (Coulson-Thomas, 2006) and especially since governance in larger 
organizations is challenged by the need to add capacity to innovate to their managers.  SMEs already enjoy the 
motivational aspect that large businesses are trying to emulate.   
 
The aspects of governance described as accountability to owners and empowerment of managers are 
actually embedded in the organizational structure of many SMEs, particularly those where there is private ownership 
and the owner is very involved in the day to day operations.   Conversely the responsibility to the broader range of 
stakeholders can become a challenge to SMEs as owner/managers/directors are very involved in their organizational 
activities.  Consideration of the interests of employees, clients and suppliers, as well as the broader community when 
making business decisions has not always been the situation in SMEs.  Consequently, the potential benefits to 
strategic direction and growth have not always been realized.   
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The following table summarizes the SME situation in relation to the aspects of accountability to owners, 
responsibility to stakeholders and the empowerment of managers.    
 
 
Table 2 Corporate Governance relative to Business Context 
Corporate Governance Big Business Context SME Context 
Accountability to Owners Primarily inherent by regulation Embedded 
Responsibility to Stakeholders Expanded group of stakeholders to be 
considered,  
Not always regulated  
Expanded group of stakeholders to be 
considered  
Not usually regulated 





The table highlights the embedded nature of accountability to owners and empowerment of managers that 
exist in the SME situation.  It is also clear from the above comparisons that more attention should be paid to 
responsibility to stakeholders in the SME situation.  This indicates that the largest portion of new resources and 
attention allocated to corporate governance in SMEs should be directed to the area of responsibility to stakeholders 
(creditors, employees, etc.).  As shown in Table 2, none of the three converging and expanding areas of governance 
are embedded in large corporations.  Therefore all three factors require significant attention and resource allocation 
in the large business environment in order to implement an improved governance model and meet the converging 
and growing expectations.  The embedded nature of management empowerment and accountability to owners are 
distinctive features of SME governance compared to large corporations.  This analysis has important implications 
for resource allocation in the area of corporate governance.     
 
This analysis is consistent with differences in management behaviour between large businesses and SMEs.  
Decisions in relation to financing the firm are considered to demonstrate this situation. 
 
The importance of capital to SMEs is well documented.  While SMEs may seek equity financing, public 
offerings are not common for most SMEs.  Such firms rely to a large extent on equity financing obtained from 
founders/owners, employees, relatives and friends, retained earnings, and venture capitalists and companies.  This is 
mainly due to requirements for listed companies which most SMEs are unable to meet.  However many SMEs do 
seek debt financing.  Unlike large businesses, SMEs largely rely on trade credit, loans from employees, friends and 
relatives, other private loans, and government lending agencies.  Furthermore, the debt in SMEs is more likely to be 
short-term oriented than is the case with larger businesses.  On one hand, the tendency to debt financing is partially 
due to its advantage relating to ownership control; on the other hand, the short-term nature of readily available debt 
financing has disadvantages such as the lack of predictable continuous resources and backup finance. 
 
SMEs are apparently in a disadvantageous position compared to large corporations when it comes to 
financing, particularly in dealing with lending institutions.  Using data from a survey of 91 banks in 45 countries, 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Pería of the World Bank (2008) find that banks perceive the SME segment to be fraught 
with macroeconomic instability in developing countries and high levels of competition in developed countries.  
These factors are viewed as the major obstacles in lending to SMEs.  In both developing and developed economies 
overall banks are less engaged with SMEs and charge such firms higher interest rates and fees than they do larger 
organizations because of the higher levels of risk and higher numbers of non-performing borrowers. 
 
How to overcome this disadvantage is not only a managerial issue but also a governance issue.  Lending 
institutions are essential to the survival of the business for SMEs and financial institutions are a very important 
stakeholder in the expanding definition of governance.  Therefore consideration of the relationship with the banking 
sector should be a focal aspect for SMEs from the viewpoint of governance.   
 
Application of the broader definition of corporate governance in the SME environment particularly in 
relationship to responsibility to a broader range of stakeholders has much to offer to the viability and growth of 
SMEs.  The specific example of an improved relationship with the providers of finance has the potential to improve 
the situation for both the SMEs and the lending organizations.    
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Some governance challenges relative to SMEs are discussed in the conclusions and recommendations in the 
next section.    
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Stakeholders expect corporate governance to provide wealth maximization for shareholders, to fulfil 
obligations to a broader range of stakeholders including employees, customers, suppliers and community, and to 
provide management control as well as management empowerment. The expectations for responsibility to 
shareholders and for management empowerment are effectively embedded in SMEs.  However SMEs are facing a 
significant challenge in relation to incorporation of responsibility to an expanded group of stakeholders.   While 
SMEs have emerged as a dominant economic force, there are significant unrealized potential benefits available by 
successfully addressing this specific aspect of corporate governance and its implementation.   
 
One of the major characteristics of modern corporations is the separation of ownership and management.  
However, unlike large corporations, most SMEs have kept the close ownership-management relationship as an 
inherent tradition.  The combined ownership-management function has a positive side in relation to governance in 
SMEs, that is, accountability to owners and empowerment of managers are embedded in the organizational 
structure.  The result is that governance is more efficient in SMEs as it is without the “agency problem” that exists in 
larger organizations.  SMEs would be well advised to direct more attention and resources to fulfil the responsibilities 
to, and improve relationships with, stakeholders.   
 
The negative side of the combined ownership-management function is that SMEs may not wish to have 
formal boards of governors or may not wish to bring in outside directors to their boards as they want to maintain 
tight ownership control.  However, in today’s competitive business environment, this attitude may set barriers to 
generating new ideas, developing better strategies and taking more innovative approaches; in the worst scenario, it 
may ultimately threat the very survival of the business due to the loss of its competitiveness.   
 
This presents a very real challenge.  How can SMEs take real advantage of the benefits arising from the 
inherent organizational structure in corporate governance and at the same time enhance the board formation to 
embrace constantly changing business environment?  It is not only a matter of how to balance the above-mentioned 
positive and negative effects but also an experiment on how to advance SME governance to a new level with greater 
commitment to a wider range of stakeholders. 
 
Additional research is warranted in the composition of SME governance structures.  While research has 
demonstrated increased capacity for strategic change by having outside directors and a larger board, SME owners 
are concerned about losing the flexibility which is one of their greatest strengths.  Dissemination of the operational 
benefits of sound governance to SMEs in relation to increased capacity to engage in new business and to implement 
strategic change is at less than optimum levels. It is therefore recommended that educators, consultants and service 
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